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Ellul On The Need For Symbolism 
by J. Wesley Baker 
Cedarville College 
Toe more I have studied Ellul's writings, the more impressed I 
have become with the central role "commi.mication" plays in his 
thought. Since my field of study is communication technologies, I 
initiallywas drawn to Ellul because of his insistence that the techno-
logical system (la technique) is dominating our era. There was, as 
well, an initial attraction because of the number of examples he 
draws from the media But I have come to see that Ellul's concern 
with communication is at a far more important level: We can hope 
for the survival of what is human only if we engage in the creation of 
symbols which allow us to retain mastery in a technological environ-
ment. The purpose of this essay is to outline for Ellul scholars the 
central place our need to symbolize plays in Ellul's thought. 
Ellul's Terminology 
In his writings about communication, Ellul makes a point of 
insisting he does not take a specialist's viewpoint on the topic. 
Temple says that while this "outsider's" orientation contributes to an 
imprecision in his terminology, its strength is in providing a "common 
sense" approach. 
Perhaps he is not always fair to leaders in the linguistic sciences, 
but (as in all his other books) he is neither a philosopher nor a 
literary critic. He writes as social commentator (and as an "ordi-
nary" layman) observing the effects of changes in the role of 
language and also as a voice for common sense on behalf of all of 
us who feel that somehow the substance of lan~ge has been 
replaced by a trick with smoke and mirror images. 
It is this orientation which leads Ellul to argue: "Defining lan-
guage by talking about codes, signifiers, the syntagma, semiotics, and 
semiology does not solve the problem" of language we face today. 
Always we must come back to simple facts, common sense, and 
commonplaces as our starting point. "2 He is concerned that an 
approach to language which is too "scientific" can rob it of its 
symbolic function. 
Human language cannot be reduced strictly to a transmission of 
information. CommunicationJinfonnation theory is extremely im-
poverished for it reduces language to a reality, doubtless scientifi-
cally knowable, but one that excludes the principal aspect of the 
phenomenon. The symbolization of society is effected through 
language and, since the beginning, this process has considered the 
social relationship as not merely the immediate contact of human 
being to human being, but as a mMiated relationship. This medi-
ation creates a symbolic space for the obligatory interpretation of 
relationships. It provides a "windbreak" between man and man and 
causes brutality to be excluded so that coexistence becomes possi-
ble. Man cannot subsist on mere physical conta<j alone; he must 
symbolize it and situate it in a symbolic universe. 
Toe risk comes from our ability to "separate the code from the 
language, the information from the spoken words, or reduce infor-
mation to bytes. ..4 Tois technical approach to language leads to a 
reductionism which eliminates "from human language everything 
that goes beyond visual information, everything that is inaccessible 
to the code. Toe result would be _!lot just an amputation, which is 
the traditional reductionist method of all the sciences, but a surgical 
excision of language's very heart . ..S As a result, Ellul is opposed to 
any approach which limits language's "breadth of meaning, ambigu-
ity, and variation in interpretation.6 Most importantly for Ellul, the 
uncertainty inherent in our symbols provides us with individual 
freedom as we seek for truth and coherence. 
Symbolization as a Basic Human Need 
Ellul calls human symbol-making "one of the most basic func-
tions of life."7 He believes that our creation in the image of the 
God-who-speaks is at the base of our symbolizing and thus serves as 
an important part of what distinguishes us from the rest of creation. 8 
It is, he says, "the specific characteristic of Homo sapiens . ... " But, 
besides defininf man, this symbol-making function is also "the key 
. to his success." Toe "success" to which Ellul refers is humankind's 
ability to survive in its milieu or environment by gaining mastery over 
it through symboli7.3tion.10 
Ellul links milieu and symboli7.ation quite closely, noting that 
"symboli7.ation is always effected in relation to the environment in 
which man lives, and as a function of the environment. "11 Ellul 
points out that it is only within "the environment (that) we have 
occasion to exercise one of the most basic functions of life, that is, 
symbolism. Toe environment gives us the chance to create symbols, 
and here are riches that spur us to development. "121t is through this 
process of a sense-making ordering of the world that "man [is able) 
to engage himself in a certain mastery of nature."13 
Mastery over our environment is made possible by this symbolic 
function as it pr:ovides humans "domination through distance and 
differentiation."14on the first point, domination through distance, 
Ellul argues that, "for there to be symbolimtion at au, the symbol-
creator must be outside what he is symbolizing; there must be some 
distance between the symbolizer and the symbolized. "15 On the 
second, domination through differentiation, distinctions for Ellul 
result from our designation of names, because the "word is creator 
in that it names things, thus specifying them by differentiating 
them."16 This gives us mastery over what we name as we attach 
importance, meaning, and place to it. "To name someone or some-
thing," he says, "is to show one's superiority over him or it. "17 A3 an 
example, Ellul refers to the Genesis account, where "Adam is con-
firmed as the head of creation when God brings all the animals to 
him so that he can give each one a name (Gen. 2:19)."18Tous, being 
comes through naming. 
The Genesis passage that establishes creation on the basis of 
separation contains the germ of the most modern ideas about 
language: it tells us that difference both establishes the word and 
proceeds from it. The word bestows being on each reality, attrib-
uting truth to it; it gives dynamism to reality and prescribes a fixed 
traject~ry /W it. In this way the word disentangles confusion and 
non being. 
Our name-making is driven by our need for coherence. Toe 
creative process allows us to order our environment through sym-
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bols. "From tlie moment man proceeds to the denomination of 
things," Ellul writes, "be bas made them enter his universe and they 
belong to a coherent ensemble. They belong to man by virtue of the 
name he bas bestowed on them. He bas not only put his mark on 
things, he bas also made then [sic] exist."2() This transformation 
romes as one symbolizes, making "his natural, objective realitv into 
a special universe that be constitutes from within himself, •21 and 
resulting in the "creation of a universe different from the one in 
which he is situated, but fully a part of his real mileau. •22 
Toe whole process of symbol-making is interpretive, making 
signs "enter into a coherent explanatory ensemble (even if only 
fictively explanatory) of which man stands as master. •23 Ellul says 
the coherence is gained as one selects which elements to feature or 
mask, in the same way as an artist interprets reality. 
(Symboli7.ation) is not like a photographic reproduction, which 
would serve no function: the painter makes choices of which char-
acteristics of reality to retain, highlighting some and making them 
carriers of meaning, while others he marks for obliteration, pushing 
them into the shadows or making them disappear altogether •.•. 
There is a transformation into a new universe, which renders 
eq,licit and in terms of relat~hip, that which is implicit and 
without apparent relationship. 
Ellul places supreme importance on this interpretive process 
which provides structure for our world because it is through "the 
symbolic transformation of reality" that one "creates the possibility 
of acquiring a non-material gras~ on reality, without which he would 
be completely unprovided for." . 
Since the creation of symbols is rooted in the environment or 
milieu in which we find ourselves, problems arise during a time of 
transition. As we have moved into the environment of la technique, 
our use of symbols bas become outdated. "[S)ince thinking is slow 
to move and verbal forms are always a step behind reality, the older 
eovirooment serves as an ideololcal reference for those who have 
been plunged into the new one." Importantly for Ellul, as we live 
during a time of transition, this tendency toward anachronistic sym-
bolization leads to "enormous errors of judgment" which result in a 
failure to identify properly the challenge of la technique.21 
Self .Symbollzatlon of la technique 
As we attempt to make sense of our new technological environ-
ment, Ellul argues that la tecfrnique itself provides coherence 
through its self-symbolization.28 Ellul contends that "technology is 
itself productive of symbols and becomes by itself its own symbol .. 
. Technology is not only an environment, nor merely an ensemble 
of means and instruments; it is itself a symbolic universe. It furnishes 
itself with its own symbols."29 As a result, "[n)ow it is technology 
which bas taken over and which produces for man the coherent 
symbols that are attributable to the technological universe . ..30 
Through the images produced by la technique some of our needs 
seem to be meL But Ellul argues that we have experienced "a 
complete inversion of the scale of needs. •31 As a result, the needs 
which are met are "artificial needs, which are unimportant, not in the 
least essential to man, but which become irrepressible, exige~ 
imperious, the only ones to be taken seriously in the long run ..•. 
Images help us make up for the I~ of the natural environment, 
a ~ to which we have never quite reconciled ourselves. Without 
contact with the reality of the natural environment "we develop an 
extremely deep need for another reality." This need is met though 
"[t)he image is mirage [which) reconciles contradictions, makes ab-
sent nature present and real again .... Images counterbalance all 
the abstractions. And they restore to us at last a reality in which we 
can live: the reality of the world of images . .33 But this "world 
imagined by the media" is a "perfectly artificial world, recomposed 
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by the images and sounds of these media. Con~uently," Ellul says, 
"there is no place for symbolization to occur. •34 
Toe end result is that we cannot gain mastery over our techno-
logical environment because the only experience we accept as "real" 
is itself the result of la technique's self-symbolization. "[11he images 
of a technical society only seem to be symbolizing by reflecting a 
reality that is itself only a reflection." Thus, instead of providing 
distance and differentation, this self-symbolization "has the effect of 
integrating, adapting, and assimilating man to technique. •35 This 
integration is encouraged by our distraction from the reality of the 
system. "Images are essential if I am to avoid seeing the day-tO-Oay 
reality I live in. They glitter continuously around me, allowing me to 
live in a sort of image-oriented fantasy. ;.36 Ellul draws a distinction 
between images as "a substitute reality" and the word, which "obliges 
me to consider reality from the point of view of truth.• He writes, 
"Artificial images, passing themselves off for truth, obliterate and 
erase the reality of my life and my society. ,,3? · 
The Need for New Symbols 
living in an environment of artificial images results in the elim-
ination of meaning: "Language becomes, in effect, a system of signs 
which answer to certain archetypes, to certain uses and to certain 
habits, but the symbolic dimension of language is destroyed. ,,38 Toe 
"reality" of the poetic, mythic and metaphysical falls before the 
"reality" of the empirical. What can be "seen" by the soul is replaced 
by what can be seen with the eyes. Toe word becomes humiliated 
by the image. Symbol becomes sign. Lan~age "becomes no more 
than a sort of organized noise,• so that "a whole part of man's 
symbolic activity is rendered impossible. Among other thJ»p, he is 
capable neither of true consciousness nor of recognition. 
Part of the problem is that the Enlightenment's elimination of 
the metaphysical makes it difficult for people in modem society to 
create a "symbolic universe," that is, a superordinate sense-making 
of our environment which is based on the ultimate. Instead, we are 
limited to that which can be bandied "scientifically." When it comes 
to language, the result bas been the study of signs apart from 
meaning; " ... the mentality of scientism bas pounced upon lan-
guage," Ellul complains, "and bas involved us in reducing the word 
to the state of an object: a scientific objecL ,.41 The tangible, what 
can be seen, becomes what is "real." 
I caMot observe the signified, nor the relationship of the signifier 
with the signified. These are "philosophical" problems. On the 
contnuy, I can observe the emission of a phrase, its circulation, 
deformation, and audition. I can even make nice diagrams of this 
process. This shows in the first place that this attitude follows the 
traditional "scientific" tendency: only what can be observed and 
analy7.ed by the classical scientific method is important ( or even 
exists, in the extreme view). Since only the communication process 
involving the signifier can be thus analyzed, it is the only thing that 
matters to us. Everything else is a metaphysical argument that 
serves only ir confuse the scientific relationship between subject 
and object. 
But in excluding meaning as beyond examination ( and therefore 
unimportant) and in concentrating "exclusively on reality and the 
concrete," we lose the truth which is "to be read between the lines or 
heard in the silent moments of discourse." While the Image limits 
us to "[t]ruth verifiable by science," the word "continually casts doubt 
on this claim . ..42 
Toe ultimate bankruptcy of the universe of images is out of sight 
for us in the environment of la technique. Toe system "presents itself 
as an environment so coherent and so unitary that it does not seem 
to have a point where man can insert anything eise."43 It "devalues 
all other mediations and man seems to have no need of symbolic 
mediation because he bas technological mediation."44 As a result, 
"[ n ]ow it is teehnology which has taken over and which produces for 
man the coherent symbols that are attributable to the technological 
universe. ,,4S 
Toe problem with this new reality is that its dependence on 
images produces the "tendency toward the disappearance of the 
symbolic function. ,,46Given the unity of the system, "man seems to 
have no need of symbolic mediation because be bas technological 
mediation. It even appears to man that technology is more effica-
cious and permits him a greater domination over what threatens him 
and a more certain protection against danger than does the symbolic 
process. ,,4? Our ability to create symbols bas been sterilized by the 
ease with which we can "consume" the system's images. "Just as 
vaccines have progressively reduced the capacity of the organism to 
create spontaneously natural immunities, so in the same way, man 
no longer creates symbols because too many are offered him at.too 
simple a level of consumption.,,48 But these images "have not elab-
orated a significant and meaningful symbolic universe . .r49 They have 
"ceased to assure us of permanence; ceased to call forth a deepened 
consciousness and thus cannot be creators of history. "so They ulti-
mately fail because they cannot meet our need for a "deep" coher-
ence. 
Provided with a technological mediation which is so efficient and 
so complete that it becomes embraced to the exclusion of all else, 
we have lost sight of the human need to create our own symbols if 
we are to survive and grow. "Man no longer feels specifically the 
need to launch himself into the adventure of initial symbolic creation 
precisely because be sees himself surrounded by those ~bols that 
are actually produced by the technological system. Toe easy 
access to the existing symbolic universe of la technique "sterilizes 
man's desire" to create one's own symbols.52 
Intervention Into the Cycle 
Toe vicious circle which is suggested by Ellul's analysis reveals to 
us the double importance of communication in his thinking: the 
seemingly complete mediation of la technique reduces our perceived 
need to create symbols, and without the creation of new symbols with 
which we can gain mastery over our new enviroment, no challenge 
to the technological mediation is possible. Thus Ellul seeks to 
provide an intervention into the cycle through his demonstration of 
the emptiness of the needs which are being met by la technique and 
the danger resulting from our loss of awareness of our need to 
symbolize. Only by breaking this vicious circle are adaptation and 
growth possible. "So long as the evolution of the symbolic universe 
remains possible, the normal evolution of socie~ is possible without 
crisis and within humanely acceptable bounds." 3 Therefore, man's 
"only chance to subsist in his human specificitY," is "to effect a 
symbolization of technology" toward human ends. 54 Toe "univocal" 
mediation by technology must be replaced with symbolization which 
is "plurivocal, equivocal, unstable in [its] applications~ and also 
deeply rooted in a rich and creative unconsciousness. "5 Ellul be-
lieves that we must "work to create new values, to reach a consensus 
on a new meaning, to create new symbols." If this is done, then it is 
possible that technologies can be placed in the role of servant once 
again. But "if society is not successful, it surely will disinteiate. In 
other words," be says, "it is now a time for invention .... " 6 It is to 
that invention of a new communication which adequately symbolizes 
the elements of la technique that Ellul calls us. 
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